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Abstract 
 
The intention of this investigation is to arrive at a greater understanding of spectatorship 
within the environment of the theatre. This thesis will use recent discoveries in neuroscience 
to unveil the processing of information in a spectator’s brain; in particular the neural 
processing system for goal related actions. This thesis will use a theory of cognition to 
investigate how the mind of the spectator works in order to understand theatre and negotiate 
with the performance. By combining the fields of theatre, cognition and neuroscience, this 
thesis intends to generate more knowledge of the mental experience of the spectator and the 
mechanisms that enable spectatorship to occur.  
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Introduction 
 
This research investigation intends to arrive at an improved understanding of spectatorship by 
analysing the conscious and unconscious process of spectating. Through this thesis, I propose 
a cognitive and neuroscientific view of spectatorship. Using secondary sources from the 
world of science and theatre, I will create an interdisciplinary discussion from what we 
already know happens at the theatre, to explore the neural process and mechanism that 
enables spectatorship to occur. This thesis uses Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual 
blending to discuss how spectatorship works in the mind; how it is that the audience can 
understand what is being presented to them and incorporate what is perceived into their own 
conceptual knowledge and understanding, ready to access as and when they need, so they can 
“run the blend”. This notion of running the blend will be discussed further in the investigation 
to explain the process of how our human minds perceive and understand the play The Woman 
in Black (2015). This thesis draws upon the neuroscientific discovery of mirror neurons to 
establish the neural underpinnings of spectator’s actions of perception. The neural mechanism 
enables spectators to experience and mirror the actions and emotions of the actors, allowing 
the spectator access to the brain of the actor, thus allowing access and understanding of the 
mind of the actor.  
 
Initially, this thesis intends to contextualise how Western audiences encounter theatre, 
through their role, positioning and motives. This thesis will explore notions of – and - the 
neural underpinnings of emotion and consciousness to understand fundamental aspects of 
spectatorship. By consolidating what we already know about theatre spectatorship and 
creating a bilateral investigation from a cognitive and neuroscientific stance, we can move 
towards a clear understanding of spectatorship. I hope this thesis adds to the richness and 
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complexity of spectatorship and generates an improved insight into how spectators watch 
theatre and what actually happens during spectatorship.  
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An overview of The Woman in Black 
 
This thesis is using the London Fortune Theatre stage adaptation of The Woman in Black 
(2015) as a means to explore spectatorship. This production gives the following synopsis of 
the play: 
A lawyer obsessed with a curse that he believes has been cast over him and his family 
by the spectre of a Woman in Black, engages a sceptical young actor to help him tell 
his terrifying story and exorcise the fear that grips his soul. It all begins innocently 
enough, but then, as they reach further into his darkest memories, they find 
themselves caught up in a world of eerie marshes and moaning winds (The Woman in 
Black, 2015). 
 
This synopsis of the play gives a clear overview of the plot, however, it does not give much 
information away, understandably, as this would spoil the show for new audiences. In order 
to create a coherent discussion and analysis, this thesis will provide a more in depth overview 
of the current production from 22nd July 2015. 
 
Cast 
Arthur Kipps – Julian Forsyth 
The Actor – Antony Eden 
 
Creative Team  
Playwright - Stephen Mallatratt                               
Author - Susan Hill                                                      
Director - Robin Herford 
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The play begins with Arthur Kipps approaching The Actor with the intention of 
recounting a ghostly incident that happened to him when he was a young man. The 
motive for recounting the tale is so that Arthur Kipps will be free from The Woman in 
Black haunting him. Initially, Arthur Kipps intends to read the tale of the incident to 
his family and friends, The Actor however, coaxes him to make the story into a play 
and convinces him to partake in the performance.  
 
It is agreed that Arthur Kipps will multi-role and take the part of several characters in 
the play within a play, and The Actor will take the part of the young Arthur Kipps. 
This allows the play within a play conceit to happen without any confusion for the 
audience, as the men can slip back into the role of their original character without any 
overlap.   
 
The performance is set out into two worlds. The first world of the performance is the 
real time part of the play; the men can be identified in their first characters. In this 
world of the performance, the men can discuss and make reference to the second 
world of the play. The second world of the play is the rehearsals; they adopt their 
alternative characters to perform Arthur Kipps’ story. The performance fluctuates 
between the real time world and rehearsal throughout the rest of the play. 
 
To eradicate any confusion as result of the shift between the real time and rehearsal, 
this thesis will only refer to the men with their identity in the real time of the 
performance.  
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The performance is staged on a very basic set, and takes full advantage of the minimal 
props. The Actor and Arthur Kipps transform the props into many different objects 
with different purposes, e.g. a wicker basket into a desk, a bed, and a pony and trap. 
On occasions throughout the performance, there is no physical prop present, however, 
The Actor and Arthur Kipps use hand gestures and language to animate the imaginary 
and actual props to make clear how they exist and are being used. 
 
There are several moments in the performance where The Woman in Black appears; 
The Actor assumes that Arthur Kipps has hired an actor to play the part of The 
Woman in Black. However, this is actually used as a conceit for The Actor to become 
cursed with the hauntings. 
 
A description of the performance is as follows; The Actor is a solicitor who has been 
commissioned to attend the funeral of Mrs. Alice Drablow and visit Eel Marsh House, 
to gather her papers and settle any outstanding affairs. It becomes palpable to The 
Actor that Mrs Drablow was not a favourable woman. The Actor has a few encounters 
with local town folk who want nothing to do with him or his business with Mrs 
Drablow’s affairs. Everyone refuses to accompany him to Eel Marsh House, except 
one local who knows the timing of the tides of the causeway. The Actor believes he 
has become cursed, as a woman in black begins to haunt him. The hauntings reach a 
crescendo and The Actor faints, Arthur Kipps rescues him and takes him home to 
safety. The Actor advances the time one year and describes walking in the park with 
his wife and child, and then watching them on a fair ground. The Actor sees The 
Woman in Black and almost simultaneously his child is thrown from the ride and dies 
instantly. The rehearsal then switches back to the real time of the performance; the 
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men congratulate each other on their performances. The Actor is particularly 
impressed that Arthur Kipps hired an actor to play The Woman in Black, Arthur 
Kipps and The Actor quiver as they realise the curse is still alive. The lights black out. 
The performance ends. 
 
This thesis will analyse particular scenes and how they are created by the actors and 
experienced by the audience in more detail throughout the following chapters to 
facilitate the investigation into spectatorship.    
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Thought Experiment  
 
Reader, I ask you please to suspend your disbelief and accompany this thesis on a 
journey, a thought experiment where the idea spectator exists. This thesis presents an 
ideal set of circumstances experienced through a model spectator; Elliot Shaw. Elliot 
is a virtual figure who exists in a virtual environment that this thesis will create. Elliot 
is a twenty-four year old male; he resides in a modern apartment in the Bermondsey 
area of London. Elliot recently graduated from University and works as a full time 
construction manager. Elliot regularly goes to gigs and attends the theatre every three 
to four months, his interests include, online gaming, sports and music. Elliot is 
particularly fond of thriller genre; he last saw Let the Right One In at The Apollo 
Theatre in London. Of course, this is all fiction made up entirely for the virtual world 
of this thesis. Elliot presents the notion of an idealised spectator; we have full access 
to his body and brain, every internal process and visceral response we can examine 
and analyse. There are limitations to this notion of the idealised spectator; numerous 
factors are set pre-performance for the spectator that affect how they interpret and 
experience the performance e.g. age, culture, knowledge. Each individual spectator’s 
emotional responses will be different. Each spectator’s experience is subjective. 
However, for the purposes of understanding how spectatorship works, Elliot enables 
this thesis to explore simultaneously the conscious and unconscious mind, and the 
cognitive processes that facilitate theatrical engagement, through his experience of 
The Woman in Black (2015). 
 
Just off to the left of Covent Garden square and next to a buzzing chain cocktail bar, 
opposite the glaring neon lights of Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, The Fortune 
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Theatre, is the residing home of The Woman in Black (2015). It appears to be on the 
smaller side of its typical theatre land neighbours, but the intimacy of the small 
looking venue should add to the ambiance. “A truly nerve shredding experience”, 
exclaims the glossy billboard above the army of ushers, uniformed in plush red velvet 
waistcoats armored with shiny gold buttons. Two young men, most likely out of work 
performers, check tickets and welcome you into the theatre with a grin raised from ear 
to ear, that begins the eerie night of terror. 
 
Down the stairs, into the basement, through the corridor on the left, the safe haven of 
the bar. The distinct aroma of red wine rises from different pockets of people. The 
poison of choice ordered, kindly decanted into a plastic cup, it is served by another 
eerie uniformed grin. At which point the excitement or nervousness becomes audible 
in the room, the latter most likely if the reviews are anything to go by. Plastic cups 
twisting and crunching under the strain of fidgety fingers, it must be coming up to 
show time. A path snakes through the guzzling crowd as the audience begins to break 
away and find their allocated seats. Out of the bar foyer, past the stairs on the right, 
emerge rows and rows of crimson. The stalls face on towards a gloomy mysterious 
stage, and before the imagination can run away with itself another uniform appears. 
Accompanied by glossy programs and multi-coloured packets of sweets, the girl asks, 
“Do you know where your seats are?” And with one eagle eyed sweep has already 
checked the ticket and planned the best route of entry that ensures minimal 
disturbances for the other spectators. With the marching orders given, eyes are 
averted to the floor and flick across the gaudy carpet inspecting each row, reciting the 
alphabet backwards until they land on row B. Row B seats 11 and 12; both aisle seats 
so fortunately there are no “excuse mes” or “thank yous”, although the seats further 
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down are empty so a disturbance is to be expected. Comfortably seated, curiosity and 
imagination can begin to play. The stage set appears fairly simple; old theatre walls 
enclosed with decrepit drapes, a protruding wooden panel and a sad looking door 
breaks through the walls and onto the stage. Stage left there is one wooden stool and 
chair, in the middle sits a very large closed wicker basket, downstage two metal mop 
bins. Imagination having run wild, drips and drabs of conversation begin to form a 
nonsensical narrative. The couple behind is in deep conversation about Daniel 
Radcliffe and the film version of The Woman in Black (2015); they both hope the 
theatrical performance is just as good. The lights appear to slightly dim, the audience 
responds with silence, the show is about to begin.  
 
Reader, you are in seat B11 and Elliot is in B12.  
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The Role of the Spectator 
 
In order to understand spectatorship, we need to understand the role of the spectator in 
relation to the role of the theatre, in particular Western theatre. Initially, attending the 
theatre was seen as more of a social event; a place to be seen, rather than a place to 
watch plays and appreciate the skill of the actors and playwrights, the latter being 
more in line with current expectations of going to the theatre (McConachie in Zarrilli 
et al, 2010:243). In the 16th and 17th century, being seen at the theatre was a priority; 
it was a reflection of your social status. Audiences would go to the theatre to display 
themselves, it was a luxury, a fashion statement, and a chance to mingle with others 
and exert your power (Victoria and Albert Museum, N.D). As the theatre reflected the 
social status of the audience, spectators would sit in seats appropriate to their status; 
those of an elevated class could sit in galleries, or pay to sit on the stage whilst the 
performance took place (Victoria and Albert Museum, N.D). The theatre was not only 
a place for the elite; the lower classes could also attend and sit in cheap seats (Victoria 
and Albert Museum, N.D). The 18th century marked an attitude change towards the 
reception of the theatre, written material about the plays became more available for 
the public to engage with and so public admiration for the theatre and actors grew 
(McConachie in Zarrilli et al, 2010:243). In 1762, The Drury Lane Theatre in London 
banned spectators from sitting on stage alongside the performers; the theatre regained 
its control as an art form rather than a socialising event (McConachie in Zarrilli et al, 
2010:243). This thesis will not give an exhaustive overview of Western theatre 
history, however this thesis agrees with Professor Emeritus Gary Jay Williams who 
makes the comment that, “Theatre is a transitory art that thrives in the immediacy of 
the cultural moment that performer and audience share, most especially, it seems, at 
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times of dynamic cultural change” (Williams in Zarrilli et al, 2010:252). The theatre 
represents and reflects society and culture.  As a result of this dynamic, the role and 
positioning of the spectator has been manipulated within various genres of theatre. 
However, this thesis only looks to analyse theatre audiences for commercial theatre 
that is easily accessible by all and not a specific or niche audience.  
 
Professor Bruce McConachie who writes about spectatorship with a cognitive 
approach states that, “There is no adequate word in English that encompasses all that 
an audience does on a regular basis at the theatre” (McConachie, 2008:3); how can 
the role of the spectator be defined when we do not know what each individual 
spectator is doing at any given moment. McConachie explains that terms often used to 
implicate audience members are rather loosely defined, terms such as “gazing”, 
“spectating” and “watching” shed little information of the role of the audience 
member and what it is they actually do. The terms imply a visual perspective and little 
more, there is no reference to any cognitive processes taking place. Of course, for 
theatrical engagements to occur, the audience are not simply required to use their eyes 
to watch, but to see; not simply listen, but hear, the audience have an active role to 
play. There is an implicit contract that Elliot agreed to engage from the moment he 
purchased his ticket; he chose to attend the theatre to see The Woman in Black (2015), 
on a specific date and time that he chose, he even chose the seat from which he will 
watch the performance. Elliot made all these decisions because he actively wants to 
engage with the performance. However, this active engagement should not disrupt the 
play unless indicated by the performers, as Susan Bennett comments: 
Spectators are thus trained to be passive in their demonstrated behaviour 
during a theatrical performance, but to be active in their decoding of the sign 
systems made available. Performers rely on the active decoding, but passive 
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behaviour of the audience so that they can unfold the planned on-stage activity 
(Bennett, 1997:206).  
 
Theatrical engagement requires cognitive skill including, as McConachie summarises, 
“attention, memory, empathy, and cultural knowledge” (McConachie, 2008:2). How 
spectators engage with the concept of theatre is inseparable from how humans 
navigate the social world. Our human brains are structurally built the same and use 
the same processes in order to gain knowledge that then feeds their perception. The 
specificity and context of what we learn and know will be different from individual to 
individual, but the process of how we learn and create these perceptions are the same. 
These internalized patterns assist with the automaticity of our responses; our 
perceptions become how we see and guide the way in which we respond. The theatre 
is an environment where people go to adopt the role of the audience; they want to be a 
spectator of a particular show because it is relevant to them in some kind of cultural, 
social, or political way. Professor Joaquin Fuster of psychiatry and biobehavioral 
sciences postulates: 
Our capacity to choose between alternatives rests on the dynamic interaction 
of our brain with the world around us and within us. Whether our choices are 
guided by preference (freedom to) or aversion (freedom from), they are 
immersed in the continuous functional engagement of our nervous system 
with the internal and external environment (Fuster, 2013: 87). 
 
 
 Fuster emphasises the relationship between the self and the environment, how the 
environment that we live in affects us and how this consequently impacts the self and 
the way in which we then choose to interact with the world. The audience place 
themselves in the role of being a spectator because they have made the choice to 
actively have this encounter with the theatre and the performance. Ultimately the 
audience have the power and freedom to be selective with how they encounter and 
engage with the theatre. Despite adopting the role of the spectator and agreeing to the 
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implicit contract, once the theatrical engagement has ended the spectator vacates this 
role, and either allows the performance to affect them, or they leave their affected 
selves at the theatre. 
 
There are different levels on which audiences can adopt the role of being a spectator; 
this depends on the style of theatre and the environment in which the performance is 
taking place. For example, immersive theatre requires audience participation in 
various forms; actors often interact and converse with spectators to provoke a 
response from them. The audience may be asked to play a part or accelerate the plot 
in one way or another. However, as this thesis looks to analyse The Woman in Black 
(2015), it will not give an expansive account of the varied roles spectators experience 
across different theatre genres. 
 
The Woman in Black (2015) is a conventional realistic play that places the audience in 
a particular relationship with the production, as outlined above by Bennett – actively 
decoding but otherwise behaving passively in terms of other interaction with the 
performance. Elliot enters The Fortune Theatre and takes his seat and becomes a 
spectator. There is no requirement of him participating in the performance. The only 
necessary requirement is that he engages with the play and he allows his attention to 
be focused on the performance, carried away on the journey of the actor’s journey 
through the narrative. To enter into the created temporary world and be receptive to 
what is offered to him. Now that Elliot has entered the world of the performance, this 
thesis can analyse the complexity of his role as a spectator, and investigate how this 
spectatorship occurs.  
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How and Why Do We Watch Theatre? 
 
Audience members go to the theatre to gratify their personal needs, such as 
entertainment, information, and enjoyment. Elliot has chosen to watch The Woman in 
Black (2015), because he wants the performance to terrify him, he enjoys the feeling 
of being scared. Some of the audience may be watching the performance for the same 
reasons, others may want to see a particular actor perform, individual motives will 
vary across the entire audience. As the theatre represents and reflects society, going to 
the theatre is a social and cultural event. The audience have the power to choose what 
they see at the theatre, and therefore have the power to choose what they want to 
encounter and be informed of. Spectators position themselves in this way because 
they want to experience the sense of connectedness that the theatre offers. Spectators 
go to and engage with theatre because they want to be part of the living situation that 
manifests (Chaikin, 1972:1), we want the performance to have an effect on us, be it 
for entertainment, emotional awareness, or social and cultural awareness. We position 
ourselves as spectators because we want the actors to make this affect or experience 
happen. David Zinder describes this biological innate connectedness/relationship 
between the spectator and actor: 
An actor standing absolutely still in front of an audience, not moving a 
muscle, rendering an expression, nor uttering a sound, yet affecting the 
spectators to tears or laughter. On the face of it this seems impossible, more a 
contradiction of theatre than an affirmation. And yet, this “silent” moment is 
in many ways a very pure, very condensed form of the art. It is, in the 
language of theatre technique, a profound moment of psychophysical 
“connectedness,” when self and other almost become one…everything that 
makes up an act of theatre is there: presence, form, […], enigma, and contact. 
(Zinder, 2009:pp.xi-xii) 
 
 
Zinder illustrates the sense of presence that the theatre has, how the theatre has this 
quality where you can’t quite put into words how you feel these emotions or impulses 
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but you know that the performance woke something inside your core and moved you. 
This encounter happens live in the theatre and occurs to each spectator individually 
and across the entire audience. Other forms similar to theatre such as television or the 
cinema cannot truly recreate this kind of encounter, because there is a lack of “the 
actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, “live” communion” (Grotowski, 
2002:19). It is through this live encounter that the spectator can cross a threshold and 
have this connectedness with the actor. 
 
Anne Bogart describes the theatre as: 
a gym for the soul, the intellect, the imagination, and the emotions. I go to the 
theatre for a workout, to be active with my entire empathetic and perceptual 
system…at the end, I want to be glowing, exhausted, exhilarated, and 
exercised from the experience. I want to be awake and engaged.  
(Bogart: 2007:74) 
 
Bogart encompasses the notion that spectatorship requires engagement of the brain, 
the mind and the senses, on our human cognitive abilities to perceive and make 
meaning. The theatre is this active environment where we go because we want to find 
something in ourselves. We want to be able to feel a sense of connectedness with the 
actors and the other spectators. Zinder and Bogart both allude to the intrinsic quality 
of the theatre and the effect it has on the spectator. This sense of pure connectedness 
which manifests through the liveness of the performance, is the essence of why we go 
to the theatre, it is at the core of spectatorship (Grotowski, 2002:19). Susan Bennett 
comments: 
 
It is, of course, true that live performance has an often uncanny ability to 
touch those very stories by and through which we understand ourselves. 
Indeed, part of what makes us a theatre audience is our willingness to engage 
with performances in ways that speak to the most intimate detail of our 
experience (Bennett, 1997:vii). 
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Bennett’s belief is that cultural context enables the experience of the performance to 
take place. Bennett suggests that the connection between the theatrical event and the 
audience is the cultural significance between them. Therefore, the theatre and 
everything that happens during the performance is so relevant and personal to the 
identity of the audience that it makes spectatorship possible (Bennett, 1997:vii). 
Despite the audience being so crucial to theatre and performance, there is an 
inadequacy to the understanding of what the spectator actually does. Bennett 
comments: 
we lack any detailed picture of the theatre audience and, in particular, their 
role(s) in the production-reception relationship. The extensive criticism of 
reader-response theorists has not achieved a codification of reading practice, 
but it has made us more aware of the complexity of the process once 
considered ‘natural’. Similarly the recent energies of theatre semiotics have 
not resulted in a codification of the elements of theatrical practice, but have 
established the multiplicity of signifying systems involved and the audience’s 
role of decoding these systems in combination and simultaneously. Neither 
theories of reading nor theatre semiotics, however, goes far beyond the issues 
facing an apparently individual subjectivity (Bennett, 1997:86). 
 
Although Bennett’s Theatre Audiences was first published in 1997, the issue of a 
coherent decoding system for theatre spectatorship is still underdeveloped. As Bennett 
states, theories of reading and semiotics are lacking because although the theories 
highlight and analyse the many possible ways of interpreting text and signs, they do 
not examine the mental process involved. Fundamentally, the cognitive operations 
that assist with the way spectators think and the way spectators make perceptions is 
missing. Professor John Lutterbie writes, “Neuroscience is beginning to confirm, we 
are not segmented creatures with separate systems for thinking and feeling but one 
organism that is able to know the world concretely and abstractly” (Lutterbie in 
McConachie and Hart, 2006:156). Theatrical engagement is possible because of the 
active processes that occur in a spectators mind and brain. Therefore cognitive 
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abilities such as consciousness, emotion and perception need to be intertwined with 
theories of theatre spectatorship to cultivate a broader understanding of the 
complexity of spectatorship.   
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Emotion  
 
Across the world men, women and children are divided for many reasons such as; 
language barriers, culture, society, age, prosperity and countless others, but despite all 
these differences each of us can be connected to each other through emotion 
(Damasio, 2000:35). Humans feel this sense of connectedness through emotion, 
because we can know it, feel it and see it, in others and ourselves. Damasio states, 
“emotions have become connected to the complex ideas, values, principles, and 
judgments that only humans can have” (Damasio, 2000:35), but what does emotion 
mean? Emotion is originally defined in The Oxford English Dictionary, as “an 
agitation of mind; an excited mental state” (OED, 2015), this 16th century definition 
has since been updated with a modern interpretation, explaining emotion as “any 
strong mental or instinctive feeling, as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc., deriving esp. 
from one's circumstances, mood, or relationship with others” (OED, 2015). This 
definition is accurate of course, but it doesn’t elicit a true sense of all that emotion 
encompasses or explain the biological underpinnings e.g. how the body and brain 
manifest emotion. Theatre Scholar Peta Tait elaborates on this definition by 
suggesting that; “emotions include (emotional) feelings and bodily sensations in the 
present (momentary), which are linked to previously experienced (remembered) 
voluntary and involuntary patterns of responses and a cognitive system of interpreting 
these” (Tait in Hurly, 2010:19). This means that we have a kind of emotional history; 
feelings and emotion arise as a reaction, and the body and brain respond accordingly 
whether we want it to or not. Once an emotion reaches our conscious awareness, we 
feel the effects internally on our body and in our minds, however, we can try and 
mask the emotion so it does not appear externally to others (Damasio, 2000:48), but 
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“if the psychological and physiological context is right, an emotion will ensue” 
(Damasio, 2000:48). An involuntary emotional response, such as Elliot screaming in 
fear, in response to the stage door slamming shut, is difficult to mask because it 
occurred almost automatically, he can control it after the initial outburst by not 
continuing to scream, although he may still feel fearful privately in his mind. A 
voluntary response occurs when The Actor’s child is killed, Elliot (our audience 
member) feels sad and upset internally at this thought, however, in this situation Elliot 
can control his bodily response not to become teary or cry. Elliot recognises that in 
the context of the theatre he can be open and receptive to his emotions, but because it 
is only a performance, he can mask the outward appearance of the emotion, so he 
doesn’t reveal the emotion as he would perhaps under other circumstances. 
McConachie comments: 
emotions – generally understood by scientists as responsive brain-body 
systems directed towards people or objects – because emotions are the most 
relevant index of spectator enjoyment and meaning-making. Good 
performance situations provide a safe space in which actors and spectators can 
explore many of their emotional vulnerabilities and needs without 
embarrassment (McConachie in Shaughnessy, 2013:189).  
 
This kind of emotional engagement that Elliot is experiencing and the feelings that 
manifest in response to the narrative is welcomed and encouraged at the theater, 
because the theatre is an efficacious environment, it is considered a place where 
spectators go because they want to have some kind of emotional encounter. 
(McConachie in Shaughnessy, 2013:189). 
 
Professor Helen Nicholson illustrates how emotions exist in the theatre: 
Emotions are contagious, they act on the body. Like other infections, emotions 
are both public and private; they temporarily inhabit the intimate spaces of 
your body but they also multiply, sometimes wantonly, from one person to 
another. This means that the theatre is a very good place to spread emotions, 
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as actors are intent on them passing on and audiences expect to be 
infected…Emotions are active and assertive, they demand attention and stir 
things up (Nicholson, 2013:20). 
 
Nicholson’s anthropomorphising of emotion transforms it into a kind of living entity 
similar to a cold or some other illness; suggesting that emotion takes a hold over the 
body and manifests itself through the body’s interoceptive and exteroceptive 
awareness. The body and brain begin to experience an emotional state before it 
reaches our conscious awareness, the autonomic responses of our bodies which we 
have little or no control over have already begun; our heart begins to race, our 
temperature may increase or decrease, our eyes become dilated, blood pressure 
increases. We become aware of our feelings once the biological process has already 
started, and we have entered into that state and begin to experience a particular 
emotion. You may become aware that you are feeling breathless; you feel yourself 
perspire; your eyes have become watery because you are on the verge of crying. 
Feeling and emotion are separate entities. Damasio suggests that feeling is an internal 
experience of emotion, we feel the effects in our mind, and Emotion is the external 
representation. McConachie and Hart elaborate: 
Emotion is the embodied response to an emotionally competent stimulus, 
while feeling is the conscious awareness of the emotion. Thus, the emotion is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the feeling; that is, an emotion can 
exist without feeling, but a feeling cannot exist without an emotion 
(McConachie and Hart, 2006:225).  
 
 
It is McConachie and Hart’s view that we cannot know another persons’ feelings and 
they cannot know ours without the outward public appearance of the emotion. We can 
detect and make perceptions about the emotions of others by their external 
representations, and similarly they can detect ours. Damasio concludes this by 
suggesting the ways in which different aspects of emotion exist, “a state of emotion, 
which can be triggered and executed non-consciously; a state of feeling, which can be 
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represented non-consciously; and a state of feeling made conscious, i.e., known to the 
organism having both emotion and feeling” (Damasio, 2000:37). 
 
Recognising an Emotion 
 
Primary emotions can be identified as; happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and 
surprise (Kemp, 2012:169). There are also many secondary and social emotions, 
which stem from and follow on from the primary categories, e.g., delight, remorse, 
shame, embarrassment, anxiety, pride, to name but a few (Damasio, 2000:51). All 
primary and secondary emotions require a biological process for the emotional state 
to manifest. Damasio states: 
Emotions are complicated collections of chemical and neural responses, 
forming a pattern; all emotions have some kind of regulatory role to play, 
leading in one way or another to the creation of circumstances advantageous 
to the organism exhibiting the phenomenon…All emotions use the body as 
their theatre (internal milieu, visceral, vestibular and musculoskeletal 
systems)…The collection of these changes constitutes the substrate for the 
neural patterns which eventually become feelings of emotion (Damasio, 
2000:51-52pp). 
 
The audience can decipher the emotional states of the performers because emotions 
are identifiable through their distinct public appearance, the audience can observe the 
performers facial expressions, body language and can listen to how they use verbal 
language to communicate. The actor may genuinely feel the emotion that they are 
portraying, or the actor may be a highly skilled individual that can replicate the 
emotion well, or perhaps they can do neither of the aforementioned and are actually 
quite poor at simulating an emotion. However, actors working in the realms of 
naturalism or realism ultimately try to replicate the physical manifestations of 
particular emotions, so the audience can catch them and make perceptions about their 
Lucy Sycamore  September 2015 
MA Thesis 
   24 
state. For example, the emotion of fear implicates the body’s physical state by 
affecting the breathing rhythms; rapid irregular inhalation and exhalation; the heart 
rate increases, and the body begins to perspire (Kemp, 2012:16). Kemp portrays the 
facial expression for fear, stating, “the lips are parted and stretched laterally; the 
eyebrows are pulled together; the upper eyelids are raised; the lower eyelids tensed” 
(Kemp, 2012: 170).  
 
Figure 1. 
 
(Kemp, 2012:170) 
Figure 1, Demonstrates the muscular arrangement for the emotion fear; the eyebrows, 
eyelids and the mouth arrangement are indicative of the muscles used (Kemp, 
2012:170). As discussed previously.  
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There are of course many emotions experienced by Elliot and the audience as a whole 
throughout The Woman in Black (2015); however, the emotion of fear emerges 
regularly during the play. As Elliot watches The Woman in Black (2015), there are 
moments throughout the play where he experiences and feels genuine fear, although 
he knows that he is watching a performance and it is not real, the emotions that he 
encounters are real. The automatic responses of the brain mean that the brain does not 
decipher between what is a performance and what is not, the perceptual systems act 
automatically. Once this automatic response has manifested and reaches Elliot’s 
conscious awareness, he can then evaluate and mediate his emotional response.  
Similar to Damasio’s notion of the body experiencing the emotion before we are 
consciously aware, Joseph LeDoux comments that: 
The emotional meaning of a stimulus can begin to be appraised by the brain 
before the perceptual systems have fully processed the stimulus. It is, indeed, 
possible for your brain to know that something is good or bad before it knows 
exactly what it is (LeDoux, 2003:69). 
 
 
The human brain processes fear through the amygdala structure, which is located in 
the frontal temporal lobe and is considered part of the limbic system. The amygdala 
works by constantly processing possible threats from facial expressions; the structure 
detects patterns in exteroceptive stimuli and passes this information to the central 
nucleus (Whalen, 2014). The central nucleus will inform the rest of the brain that 
there is a possible danger or threat and enables the body’s relevant reflex and 
response systems to become active, so it can deal with the external if necessary 
(Whalen, 2014). If the central nucleus recognises and understands that the stimulus is 
of no threat, it does not inform the rest of the brain (Whalen, 2014). Dr Paul Whalen 
has focused his research on investigating the anatomy of the amygdala and the role 
that the amygdala plays in emotion; he states that: 
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Facial expressions mediate a critical portion of our nonverbal communication. 
From the expressions of others we can glean information about their internal 
emotional state, their intentions, and/or their reaction to contextual events in 
our immediate environment…Since a fearful face contains an immense 
amount of configurable information (e.g., raised brows, wide eyes, slightly 
open mouth, etc.), it is likely that the amygdala does not compute all this 
information in such a short time frame. Indeed, the presentation of fearful eye 
whites using backward masking has been shown to be sufficient to produce 
amygdala activation (Whalen, 2013:78-79pp). 
 
 
Backwards masking is a way to test something without it being subjectively reported 
by the patient, e.g., a test patient is wired to an fMRI machine so their brain activity 
can be recorded, they are then asked to watch a video and then report what they saw 
(Whalen, 2014). Whalen used positive faces as a mask to hide the fear faces, so that 
the fear face was not consciously reportable. This means that Whalen could discover 
what the patient thought they saw, and what the amygdala actually processed. From 
this Whalen concluded that the amygdala could detect fear, without us being able to 
report that we saw a fear face. 
 
Figure 2.  
  
 (Kim et al, 2010:364)  
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Figure 2, demonstrates the amygdala trials using “face-masked fearful trials” (Kim et 
al, 2010:364). The female face shown for 17 milliseconds represents the fearful face, 
so this is shown to the patient very quickly (Kim et al, 2010). The male face shown 
for 183 milliseconds is the neutral face used to mask the fear face that was shown 
previously. The third clip shown is blank; this is presented to the patient for 300 
milliseconds (Kim et al, 2010). This trial uses a neutral human face to mask the 
human fear face. The patient’s brain activity was recorded using fMRI scans to show 
the activity of the amygdala. The patients were assessed after the trial took place, to 
examine what they thought they saw, they were asked to describe the faces (Kim et al, 
2010). The trial concluded that the human neutral face successfully masked the fear 
face in the patient’s subjective awareness (Kim et al, 2010). The fMRI data showed 
activation in the amygdala whilst the fear face was presented, and then whilst the 
neutral face was shown the activity in the amygdala decreased (Kim et al, 2010). 
 
Whalen further tested the amygdala response by creating patterns using contours and 
meta-contrasting that represent a neutral state, to test how good the amygdala is at 
detecting fear without the context of human face. 
Figure 3. 
        (Kim et al, 2010:364) 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the “pattern-masked fearful trials” (Kim et al, 2010:364). The 
trials used the same format as the previous trial; however, the second presented clip 
uses a contour pattern as a neutral stimulant as opposed to the human neutral face. 
Similar to the previous trial, the patient did not report the fear face of the woman. The 
fMRI data showed amygdala activity in response to the woman’s facial expression. 
When the contour pattern representing neutral was presented, the data showed a 
decreased amount of activity (Kim et al, 2010). This means that the amygdala can 
detected fear signals whether masked by neutral faces or a pattern, and that the patient 
is not subjectively aware of the fearful faces (Kim et al, 2010). 
 
This demonstrates how the neural underpinnings of emotion are detected prior to us 
being aware, and that our bodies can control the commands for emotion to ensue; 
none of the patients entered into a conscious fearful emotional state. From this 
research Whalen demonstrates that there are mechanisms in our brain that detect 
possible emotional triggers without us even being subjectively aware (Whalen, 2014). 
 
Whilst watching the play, the amygdala structure in Elliot’s brain is constantly 
processing all the information available. An old haggard witchy woman has suddenly 
appeared upstage and leers at The Actor, consequently The Actor yells and points 
towards her, Arthur Kipps screams “No” and leaps towards The Actor to protect him. 
Elliot’s shoulders jump upwards into his neck and his body jolts backwards into his 
seat because he was taken aback by the sudden appearance of the old woman. The 
amygdala couldn’t predict this action because it was a surprise, but responds 
immediately by sending a signal to the central nucleus, and in this instance a fear 
response was triggered in Elliot, as a way of rapidly protecting him from any possible 
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danger. Elliot observed both Arthur Kipps and The Actor react to the old woman by 
expressing the muscular configuration of fear on their faces and took preventative 
action in response to the old woman; Arthur Kipps leaps to protect The Actor. Elliot’s 
amygdala system detects the appearance of the old woman and processes this 
information as a possible threat. However, Elliot’s amygdala system also detected that 
others responded to the old woman with fear, so the amygdala system uses this 
sensory input to guide his response as a means to deal with the threat. Whalen 
comments that “facial expressions of emotion have predicted important events for us 
in the past, and we can use this information about previous associated outcomes to 
respond appropriately to expressions we encounter subsequently” (Whalen, 
2013:78:79pp). The amygdala works for the performance exactly the same as it would 
outside of the theatre. There is no difference in the processing of the information at 
the neural basis of the emotion. However, at a conscious level the feeling of fear that 
Elliot feels is only a fleeting emotion because he is aware that he is at the theatre and 
watching a performance, and he doesn’t need to respond as he would under different 
circumstances e.g. a figure suddenly appearing down a dark alley way on his way 
home.  
 
At the theatre, spectators can respond individually and also as an integrated audience, 
and they will experience the same or a similar array of emotions to different extents 
(McConachie, 2013:68). When the old woman made her sudden appearance on stage, 
the audience elicited an emotional response as a group, half of the spectators in the 
auditorium shrieked simultaneously as an immediate response. As a result of this the 
audience became engulfed in low-leveled subdued laughter. Joyous laughter is 
expressed through a smiling mouth; the corners are stretched far and wide, the body is 
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very relaxed, the head is tilted upwards and the eyes are squinted. The laughter of the 
audience at this moment was of a nervous disposition. Rather than exhibiting a joyous 
laughter expression, the audience is laughing through their fear faces, so the laugh is 
strained and releases the feeling of alarm and embarrassment. The initial emotion of 
fear seeped through the spectators’ perceptual systems and manifested to an audible 
noise, this then infected the rest of the audience, and this then resulted in a new 
contagious emotional state of nervous laughter. Elliot realises he is also laughing 
nervously.   
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Consciousness 
 
 
Whilst Elliot sits in the audience waiting for the show to begin, he flicks through the 
glossy programme accompanying the play. Having gazed over the pictures of the 
actors and previews of the performance, he scrunches and tightens the programme 
into a tube like shape and taps it on his knee in a rhythmic pattern. Elliot becomes 
aware that is he fidgeting because he feels apprehensive about the show’s scary 
reputation, and he knows he scares quite easily. Elliot places the programme on the 
floor and focuses on the stage whilst listening to the surrounding conversations. Elliot 
begins to listen attentively to a conversation between a man and a woman behind him. 
Their discussion reflects on the film adaptation of The Woman in Black (2015) by 
James Watkins, their chatter highlights the performance of Daniel Radcliffe, who 
starred in the film. The woman concludes the conversation with her hope that the play 
is just as good as the film. Elliot picks up that they are both fond of the adaptation; 
Elliot has not seen the film but hopes the play exceeds their expectations. Echoes of 
Harry Potter fill the auditorium, Elliot releases a little chuckle and his mouth 
transforms into a grin, he nods along at the recollection of his favourite book. A group 
of gaggling girls interrupt this thought as they seat themselves in the row adjacent to 
his across the aisle. Elliot envisions that they’ll scream with terror at some point 
throughout the play, as will he most likely.  
 
In a matter of minutes Elliot has fluctuated between being aware of his own body 
state; concerned himself with the attitude and desires of others in his surroundings; 
reflected on his own thoughts; and made predictions about the future emotional states 
and actions of others and himself. Elliot is aware of his private and personal feelings; 
he can also think retrospectively about things and make future predictions. At the 
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same time he can infer the feelings of others and use this knowledge to make future 
predictions of action and behaviour on this basis. Elliot, however, does not have 
access to the private and personal feelings of others, and others cannot access his. 
This ability is defined as consciousness. The concept of consciousness has become 
regarded as embodied; the brain and body works together as one rather than as 
separate entities, and how this whole body interfaces with the external world. Bernard 
Baars explains embodied consciousness: 
The contents of consciousness include the immediate perceptual world; inner 
speech and visual imagery; the fleeting present and its fading traces in 
immediate memory; bodily feelings like pleasure, pain, and excitement; surges 
of feeling; autobiographical memories as they are recalled; clear and 
immediate intentions, expectations, and actions; explicit beliefs about oneself 
and the world; and concepts that are abstract but focal (Baars, 2001 cited in 
MeCutcheon et al, 2013:3). 
 
Antonio Damasio furthers this: 
Consciousness is, in effect, the key to a life examined, for better and for 
worse, our beginner’s permit into knowing all about the hunger, the thirst, the 
sex, the tears, the laughter, the kicks, the punches, the flow of images we call 
thought, the feelings, the words, the stories, the beliefs, the music, the poetry, 
the happiness and the ecstasy. At its simplest and most basic level, 
consciousness lets us recognize an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a 
concern for the self. At its most complex and elaborate level, consciousness 
helps us develop a concern for other selves and improve the art of life. 
(Damasio, 2000:5). 
 
Damasio suggests that consciousness enables us to learn and gain knowledge about 
our surroundings and ourselves; we can identify between the self and others and 
understand that they are separate entities (Damasio, 2000). Many studies highlight 
that due to the nature of consciousness there must be various states of consciousness, 
this has been suggested because of the many forms of subjective experience and 
subjective feelings; including subconscious feelings that we are not aware of 
(McCutcheon, 2013). Damasio conceptualises consciousness into two brackets, core 
consciousness and extended consciousness. Damasio defined the former as primary 
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and simple, relating only to the individual; core consciousness provides one with 
knowledge about the self in the moment, the here and now (McConachie and Hart, 
2006). Core consciousness is exhibited through Elliot’s “instinctual movement and 
voluntary responses” (Lutterbie in McConachie and Hart, 2006:158). For example, if 
Elliot were to scream and jolt backwards in fear because of the performance, he 
responds with an immediate impulse that has not been filtered and controlled and does 
not require much conscious awareness. However, Elliot is aware of his own body and 
how he feels. The latter involves more complex notions, developing the sense of self 
into forming an identity. Extended consciousness can alternate between different 
modes of time, the “lived past and of the anticipated future” (Damasio cited in 
McConachie and Hart, 2006:158), as well as the present. It is more advanced than 
core consciousness, and has been linked to functions such as language and long-term 
memory; extended consciousness allows human creativity to flourish (Damasio, 
2005). Extended consciousness is exhibited through Elliott’s ability to go to the 
theatre and enjoy the thriller genre; he understands that what he is watching is not real 
and so he enjoys the fear feelings that manifest, rather than entering a full on fearful 
emotional state he enters a kind of theatrical fearfulness. Elliot is also aware that 
other’s experience and feelings of the performance of The Woman in Black (2015) 
will differ from his, but they will be able to engage in conversation and discuss their 
subjective views.  
 
Conscious experience is our awareness of something we have perceived; prior to this 
awareness, unconscious processes occur in order for us to be able to report evidence 
of consciousness (Lamme, 2006). In figure 4, Victor A.F. Lamme has composed a list 
detailing evidence of unconscious processing in response to a visual stimulus, and 
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also evidence of the conscious experience. Lamme has set up a comparison between 
the neural perceptions of a stimulus, this is when our signal receptors first detects an 
input, and how this then reaches our awareness and we can actually report a percept 
(Lamme, 2006). 
 
Figure 4. 
 
   (Lamme, 2006:497). 
 
In Figure 4, the top half of the list suggests factors, which are considered as evidence 
for our conscious awareness of a stimulus. The lower half of the list, from the dotted 
line and arrow, depicts a comprehensive suggestion of processes that occur during the 
processing of a visual stimulus, prior to knowledge of the stimulus reaching our 
consciousness (Lamme, 2006). Lamme depicts the process of a visual stimulus being 
accepted at a neural level and then at an experiential level, he says: 
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When a new image hits the retina, it is processed through successive levels of 
visual cortex, by means of feedforward connections, working at an astonishing 
speed. Each level takes only 10ms of processing, so that in about 100-150ms 
the whole brain ‘knows’ about the new image before our eyes, and potential 
motor responses are prepared. From the very first action potentials that are 
fired, neurons exhibit complex tuning properties such as selectivity for 
motion, depth, colour or shape, and even respond selectively to faces. Thus, 
the feedforward sweep enables a rapid extraction of complex and meaningful 
features from the visual scene, and lays down potential motor responses to act 
on the incoming information (Lamme, 2006:495-497pp). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
(Lamme, 2006:497). 
 
 
Figure 5 presents a visual diagram of the feedforward sweep, as described in the 
previous paragraph by Lamme. Feedforward sweep is a process where information 
about the visual input is passed around the brain to evoke possible responses (Lamme, 
2006). Feedforward sweep is entirely an unconscious process, Elliot would not be 
aware of the information being extracted by the visual input, and would therefore not 
consciously respond (Lamme, 2006). 
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The next stages of the process facilitate the visual stimulus to reach Elliot’s 
conscious. Firstly, recurrent processing breaks down all the visual components of the 
stimulus and sends this information to areas of the brain that deal with visual sensory 
perceptions (Lamme, 2006). Secondly, the information is then passed around further 
areas of the brain, for example the frontoparietal network, which brings the stimulus 
to Elliot’s attention, the stimulus becomes reportable (Lamme, 2006). 
 
Figure 6. 
 
 
(Lamme, 2006:497). 
 
Figure 6, demonstrates the visual components of the stimulus being passed around the 
visual areas, Lamme describes this as the “Localized recurrent processing” (Lamme, 
2006:497). 
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Figure 7. 
 
 
(Lamme, 2006:497). 
 
 
Figure 7, demonstrates the recurrent processing, expanding the communication of the 
visual stimulus to other areas, and from this a conscious perception is formed 
(Lamme, 2006). 
 
Lamme provides a partial explanation for how a visual stimulus reaches our 
consciousness; Lamme’s view is that recurrent processing is the key ingredient that 
enables conscious experience (Lamme, 2006). Lamme’s explanation of consciousness 
can be examined through Elliot’s conscious awareness of the emotional state of fear, 
which he frequently enters into through the theatrical event. Evidence of the 
unconscious processing of fear can be demonstrated through the amygdala system. 
The Actor is in a fearful emotion state as a response to seeing a ghostly figure. Elliot’s 
amygdala detects and processes the eye whites of The Actor; his eyes are enlarged 
showing an increased amount of eye whites. Elliot’s amygdala detects that another, 
who is like me, has responded to a stimulus with a fearful face, therefore I should 
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respond with fear? This process is entirely unconscious to Elliot. The amygdala 
carries the localized recurrent processing of the visual input, evaluating the eye whites 
and passes this information of the fear face to other areas of the brain, to work out 
what the perceived is and what response is needed. Through this cognitive process 
Elliot enters into a conscious state of fear. The brain uses the initial eye white input to 
elicit a response in Elliot. The neural pattern of fear manifests through Elliot’s own 
facial expressions; his eyes also become enlarged similar to The Actors, this enables 
him a wide sight of vision to detect any possible threats of danger. Elliot physically 
jerks his body backwards into his seat as though he were moving out of dangers way. 
Moreover, Elliot is aware of the fearfulness he feels as a result of the recurrent 
processing of the amygdala.  
 
There are many theories surrounding the phenomenon that is consciousness. 
Neuroscience has located no specific area of the brain that enables conscious thought 
to occur. However, neuroscientists are currently moving more towards the idea that 
consciousness occurs through communication between networks of areas in the brain. 
This means that the neural underpinnings of consciousness rely on other cognitive 
abilities in order to define the phenomenon. In the theatre, consciousness is seen as an 
innate physic quality that allows spectators to engage with the self and others. 
Consciousness allows Elliot to place himself in the role of the spectator, enables him 
to encounter the theatre and think abstractly about the performance.   
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Conceptual Blending 
 
In a previous chapter titled “Thought Experiment”, this thesis discussed a 
conversation overheard by Elliot prior to the start of the play. The conversation took 
place between a male and female spectator; the discussion revolved around the actor 
Daniel Radcliffe. The spectators recalled the film adaptation of The Woman in Black 
(2015) and considered Daniel Radcliffe’s performance in the blockbuster. They 
discussed the Hollywood film in relation to the West End stage adaptation that had 
yet to commence, they both conferred that they would like the theatre actors to outdo 
Daniel Radcliffe’s skilful performance. The conversation progressed into Daniel 
Radcliffe’s performance as Harry Potter in the Harry Potter film series. In this 
discussion the spectators are using counterpart connections of Daniel Radcliffe e.g. 
role and matching them to separate inputs e.g. different films, to create a blend of 
information. From this emerges a concept of Daniel Radcliffe involving all of the 
inputs  (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:46-47pp). This process is called conceptual 
blending, but it also commonly referred to as conceptual integration. Simply put, 
conceptual blending connects different concepts of knowledge by finding a shared 
element, and then maps the shared element to each separate input in order to create an 
emergent structure that integrates them into one blend. Conceptual blending is an 
internal cognitive process, and through this ubiquitous mechanism manifests 
conscious conceptual meaning. In Fauconnier and Turner’s, The Way We Think, the 
theory conceptual blending is presented as fundamental across a spectrum, from the 
most basic human everyday meaning making through to our most imaginative 
creations, Fauconnier and Turner assert: 
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Conceptual blending operates largely behind the scenes. We are not 
consciously aware of its hidden complexities, any more than we are 
consciously aware of the complexities of perception involved in, for example, 
seeing a blue cup. Almost invisible to consciousness, conceptual blending 
choreographs vast networks of conceptual meaning, yielding cognitive 
products that, at the conscious level, appear simple. The way we think is not 
the way we think we think. Everyday thought seems straightforward, but even 
our simplest thinking is astonishingly complex (Fauconnier and Turner, 
2002:V). 
 
Crucial for the human mind to make meaning, Fauconnier and Turner posit that 
within our knowledge structure we have mental spaces, which are: 
small conceptual packets structured as we think and talk, for purposes of local 
understanding and action…Mental spaces are very partial…They are 
interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold. (…) 
[They] can be used generally to model dynamic mappings in thought and 
language (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:40).  
 
We incorporate selective information that is common amongst the inputs to create a 
new blend that binds all the information we need, so it is readily accessible. The 
knowledge counterparts could be “connections between frames and roles in frames, 
connections of identity or transformation or representation, analogical connections, 
metaphoric connections, and, more generally, “vital relations” mappings” (Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002:46-47pp). Fauconnier and Turner have formulated a basic diagram 
to illustrate the connections in the process in the way we think.  
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Figure 8. 
      (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:46) 
In figure 8, there are four circles, which represent different mental spaces; two circles 
represent the initial inputs. There is one generic mental space where commonalities 
are found between the two inputs. Fauconnier and Turner use the lines in the diagram 
to show possible conceptual links, the unbroken lines between the two inputs are 
knowledge counterpart connections that have been matched e.g., identity (Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002:46-48pp). The dotted lines demonstrate conceptual projections 
mapped from different aspects of the inputs; the projections are selected to expand the 
structure of the already existing inputs to create a new conceptual blend (Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002:46-48pp). 
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For a theatre audience, an immediate conceptual blend is that of the actor-character 
scenario, when a spectator goes to the theatre they are aware that they are watching a 
performance; actors play the characters on stage. Elliot is aware that Arthur Kipps and 
The Actor are both characters played by actors and that beyond the theatre; the actors 
have separate identities as Julian Forsyth and Antony Eden. This knowledge is the 
product of a blend; Elliot unconsciously uses the input of one framework of 
knowledge, the first being the character on stage with specific traits, dialect and 
costume. Elliot perceives Arthur Kipps as an old man from London, and middle class.  
Elliot then maps this to the second input, the actor playing the character has a separate 
identity from this particular role and as soon as they step off stage they will resume 
their habitual identity, which is unknown to Elliot. The mapping of the inputs creates 
a new blend; Elliot becomes consciously aware that the actor exists as two separate 
identities and simultaneously as one. Fauconnier and Turner state: 
Dramatic performances are deliberate blends of a living person with an 
identity. They give us a living person in one input and a different person, an 
actor in another. The person on stage is a blend of these two. The character 
portrayed may be entirely fictional, but there is still a space, a fictional one, in 
which that person is alive. In the blend, the person sounds and moves like the 
actor and is where the actor is, but the actor in her performance tries to accept 
projections from the character portrayed, and so modifies her language, 
appearance, dress, attitudes, and gestures. For the spectator, the perceived 
living, moving, and speaking body is a supreme material anchor. […] In 
principle, actors are linked to characters by virtue of performing in the real 
world actions that share physical properties with actions performed by the 
characters in the represented world. […] While we perceive a single scene, we 
are simultaneously aware of the actor moving and talking on stage in front of 
an audience, and of the corresponding character moving and talking within the 
represented story world (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 266). 
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Figure 9. 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
(Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:266-267pp) 
Figure 9, demonstrates actor character conceptual blend using Fauconnier and Turners 
diagram.   
 
In The Woman in Black (2015), Arthur Kipps actually assumes the identity of many 
roles throughout the performance. With each character that Arthur Kipps plays, he 
adopts various accents such as cockney and Yorkshire; he modifies his costume using 
scarves, coats and hats, and adjusts his hairstyle. Arthur Kipps makes each character 
visibly and audibly distinct from each other, as to make them clearly identifiable. This 
means that there are more layers of blends for Elliot to understand. Julian Forsyth is 
an actor who plays the character; Arthur Kipps; Arthur Kipps plays the character Mr 
Samuel Daily; Arthur Kipps also plays the character Mr Horatio Jerome; Arthur 
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Kipps also plays the character Keckwick. There are many blends in this sequence for 
Elliot to comprehend, Elliot has used the input of each separate character to create a 
blend that works and exists for him, so he can call upon that blend without hesitation 
when Arthur Kipps seamlessly switches between each of these characters and 
suddenly appears on stage as a different character from when he exited the stage. 
These conceptual blends are constructed through the framework of the performance, 
and once the performance has ended the temporary representational structure that had 
been blended to perceive the inputs emerges as its own structure (Grady, Oakley and 
Coulson, 1999). The blend that emerges is then readily available for Elliot to access 
when he needs to, so each time that he discusses this performance he will have the 
relevant conceptual knowledge to run the blend. Of course the specific blend 
information related to each theatre show will vary but the concept of creating and 
running the blend remains the same. Learned blends are articulated in the unconscious 
mind, Fauconnier and Turner postulate: 
It might seem strange that the systematicity and intricacy of some of our most 
basic and common mental abilities could go unrecognized for so long […] it 
may be part of the evolutionary adaptiveness of these mechanisms that they 
should be invisible to consciousness, just as backstage labor involved in 
putting on a play works best if it is unnoticed. Whatever the reason, we ignore 
these common operations in everyday life […] Even after training, the mind 
seems to have only feeble abilities to represent to itself consciously what the 
unconscious mind does easily (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:18). 
 
Fauconnier and Turner are referring to the “many different aspects of human life” 
(Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:18) where conceptual blending manifests perception. 
The theatre can almost be seen as ontologically different, because the theatre is an 
environment where blends are made to happen by the actors, directors and 
playwrights, and the spectators are positioned to encounter the blends. Rhonda Blair 
states that: 
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Blending is a fundamental part of the actor’s and director’s manipulation of 
language and imagery in order to engage the material on which they’re working 
in as fully felt and specific a way as possible. Living and playing “in the blend” 
is at the root of originality and creativity (Blair, 2009:94) 
 
Moreover, Fauconnier and Turner ascertain that conceptual blending is how we 
operate and function in the world, not just in the theatre. Fauconnier and Turner state 
that once “we construe the physical, mental and social worlds we live in by the virtue 
of the integrations we achieve through biology and culture. There is no other way for 
us to apprehend the world” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008:390). Fauconnier and 
Turner describing this as “living in the blend” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008:390); 
once we have blended something and have integrated it into our knowledge, it will be 
virtually impossible to not see the blend. For example, as you read from this thesis, 
you can see the symbols on the page as coordinated words from the English language, 
from which you construct sentences and in turn enable me to communicate to you. As 
adults we have mastered this ability to run the blend without struggle but for a pre-
school infant these symbols would have no meaning or seeable function, but the 
plasticity of the child’s brain means that in their developmental years they too will 
integrate our complex coordinated cultural blends, so they too will be able to “live in 
the blend” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008:389-396pp). A child will build the essential 
tools to “live in the blend” through imitation and mimicry, parents repeat words for 
their children to mimic to encourage the use of language. This activity enables the 
child to communicate and learn words without knowing their useful and proper 
meaning. As the child develops the brain is mapping and developing a coherent 
network that is necessary for the child to understand the rules and structure of our 
culture and language (Fauconnier and Turner, 208:389-396pp).  
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As Blair previously stated, directors and actors manipulate the audience with the 
intention to evoke particular emotions and memories and lead the response of the 
audience. Generally the audience will have a synchronic understanding of the 
performance, and yet each spectator has the freedom and possibility to choose 
between an infinite amount of memories and emotional responses. Fuster uses this 
brilliantly simple phrase “cells that fire together wire together” (Fuster, 2009:15); this 
means that any piece of knowledge or memory that we retain is intertwined with 
“sensory, motor, or emotional events experienced at, or nearly at the same time” 
(Fuster, 2009:15). Fuster goes on to say “as a result of that temporal coincidence or 
near coincidence, those events are associated with one or another by the strengthening 
of the contacts (synapses) between the cell assemblies or nets that represent them” 
(Fuster, 2009:15). Each spectator has isomorphic common knowledge but there is 
variance in each spectator’s individual neuronal combinations (Fuster, 2009:15), the 
spectator uses input 1a, the living person, as a vessel to project aspects of themselves 
or concepts personal to them. These projections will then meet with the actors and 
directors created concept in the generic mental space to create a blended character that 
exists privately for each spectator, and across the audience for the performance.  
 
Professor Bruce McConachie gives insight to the dynamic of conceptual blending and 
suggests how spectators multitask between numerous observations and place their 
attention in many different aspects of the performance at any possible time. 
McConachie writes: 
While watching Hamlet, spectators are implicitly invited to consider the skills 
of the actors playing the protagonist and the excellence of Shakespeare’s 
poetic verse, in addition to blending both together to create a specific version 
of skillful actor/Shakespearean Hamlet. This means that spectators can move 
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among at least three modes of attention while listening to the ‘To be or not to 
be’ soliloquy (McConachie, 2013: 53). 
 
McConachie furthers the spectator’s ability to multitask by suggesting that spectating 
“involves conscious shifts in attention, empathy, emotions, narrative, theatrical 
conventions, memory, and cultural networks” (McConachie, 2013: 54). McConachie 
suggests eight different oscillations within a two-minute time frame. These include: 
mentally step back from the immediate situation on stage to compare this 
particular actor’s Hamlet with Kenneth Branagh’s performance in the same 
scene […] take a moment to cross your legs […] wonder at the shift in 
lightning that allowed the actor playing the ghost to appear suddenly on stage 
without anyone seeing his entrance […] try to refocus your attention onto the 
stage after a spectator sitting behind you suddenly sneezes” (McConachie, 
2013: 54).  
 
McConachie demonstrates that the spectator integrates many different shifts whilst 
being an audience. Elliot undergoes his own oscillations throughout the entire 
performance, partly of his own accord and partly due to other spectators. At the 
beginning of the performance, Elliot is rather interested in the costume of The Actor, 
observing that he has a watch on his left wrist; Elliot ponders whether it actually 
works. As The Actors sleeves are half rolled up, Elliot can see that he has veiny hands 
and arms, Elliot contemplates that The Actor has a good physique and must work out. 
Elliot also contemplates how performing in The Woman in Black (2015) must be a 
good consistent job for an actor. Elliot focuses his attention back to the performance 
just as Arthur Kipps has agreed to perform his story. Fifteen minutes into the 
performance a family of late comers arrive, Elliot hears them shuffle down the aisle 
towards him, realising there are empty seats to his left, he awkwardly clutches his 
knees into his chest so the theatre chair slightly tilts and the tardy family can pass 
him. The spectator in seat B11, next to Elliot, sighs loudly and scowls as they 
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scramble past. Once everyone is settled, Elliot’s attention is occasionally jolted by his 
fellow screaming spectators, although he rather enjoys the extra scare. Each 
spectator’s experience of the performance will vary, and so each spectator will have 
manifested individual blends personal to him or her throughout the performance, 
depending on their experience of the theatre. Fauconnier and Turner state that “What 
the real binding allows a real brain to do is apply the general schema behind the 
logical formula to particular things and individuals to keep track of when they count 
as the same and when they count as different (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:12). 
Moreover, conceptual blending is a model of how the mind works and how humans 
construct meaning from the world around them.  
 
In Western theatre, the audience are propelled to “live in the blend”, a spectator is not 
a passive voyeur but rather they have an active role within the experience of the 
performance. The audience are present; as Grotowski postulates theatre cannot exist 
without an audience “It cannot exist without the actor-spectator relationship of 
perceptual, direct, "live" communion. […] At least one spectator is needed to make it 
a performance” (Grotowski, 2002:19-32). This sole communion is the basic element 
that must exist for theatre; all other elements are superfluous (Grotowski, 2002:19). 
Grotowski continues, “Since our theatre consists only of actors and audience, we 
make special demands on both parties. Even though we cannot educate the audience - 
not systematically, at least - we can educate the actor” (Grotowski, 2002:33). The 
actors are vessels for the spectator to perceive, imagine, empathize, engage with and 
respond to; conceptual blending is manifested, in this form through the actors, and 
enables the spectator to be imaginatively open and receptive with themselves and to 
the world of the performance, to everything that is offered to them. The actors 
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themselves have to conceptually blend and create their character so it works for the 
performance. This character would have been manifested by selecting and combining 
different pockets of knowledge and imagined projections to build a version of the 
character, that the audience can engage with and can further the initial blend 
presented to them in the performance. Elliot has the possibility to imagine and create 
infinite amounts of blends whilst watching Arthur Kipps and The Actor in The 
Woman in Black (2015), as do the other spectators, conceptual blending does not 
provide definite perceptions, rather as Cook comments: 
The network of spaces prompted in a given situation is more powerful as a 
process in a flux, a series of variables, than simply a final blend. Almost by 
design, a complete description of the spaces within a network built by a blend 
is impossible, since there are an infinite number of possible associated spaces. 
The value of applying blending theory to a text or performance does not lie in 
its taxonomic abilities, but rather in how it maps the likely spaces and 
uncovers connections not immediately apparent though maintaining power 
even in dormancy (Cook, 2007:584). 
 
Conceptual blending confirms that Elliot and the other spectators have an active role 
to play and become part of the living situation of the performance (Chaikin, 1972:1). 
Elliot gives nuances of himself to the characters on stage, and these nuances that 
emerge and manifest are the real crux of spectatorship. The audience take on a huge 
role in the performance by accepting, projecting and creating blends because this is 
how the performance comes alive. If Elliot could not accept and understand the 
simple blend of the actor character scenario, he would not be able to comprehend 
anything further in the performance, and would therefore not be able to adopt the role 
of the spectator. Conceptual blending facilitates the unconscious and invisible process 
of constructing meaning.  
 
Lucy Sycamore  September 2015 
MA Thesis 
   50 
Mirror Neurons 
 
 
As Elliot, our idealised spectator sits in the audience watching Robin Herford’s; The 
Woman in Black (2015), there are several internal mechanisms and processes 
operating simultaneously that enable this spectatorship to occur. As the auditorium 
lights dim and the stage lights come to life, Elliot fixes his eyes on Arthur Kipps who 
has just entered stage right. Elliot observes Arthur Kipps place his overcoat and 
briefcase upon the basket, as he makes his way towards the centre of the stage, Elliot 
notices that Arthur Kipps has kept a large book tucked under his left arm. Elliot 
observes as Arthur Kipps opens the manuscript and adjusts his positioning as if to get 
comfy and begins to read; “It was nine thirty on Christmas eve…” the rest of the spiel 
is inaudible to Elliot as Arthur Kipps mumbles through the lines. Whilst straining to 
hear Arthur Kipps, Elliot dissects the affordances he offers; cognitive scientist James 
Gibson coined the term affordance, as a way of describing objects with action 
potentials (Shaughnessy, 2013). Elliot observes Arthur Kipps’ costume is fashioned in 
a formal style in shades of grey, black and white. Both of Arthur Kipps hands are 
firmly grasping the manuscript from which he is reading. Elliot is observing each and 
every distal movement; he is absorbing all the affordances presented to him to create 
a potentiality of action for the objects and the actor (McConachie, 2013:14).  
 
The moment that Elliot observes Arthur Kipps grasping the book with his hands, a 
network in Elliot’s brain becomes active and begins to respond to this specific hand 
action. Action understanding is a gateway to understanding others, so as Elliot 
watches the actions of the performers, he begins to understand their motives and 
intentions. Action understanding is made possible by mirror neurons; a new 
visuomotor neuron discovered and described by neuroscientists over the last few 
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decades. Effectively mirror neurons are thought to be part of the neural mechanism of 
understanding the action and behaviours of others.   
 
Mirror neurons were initially discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of the 
Macaque monkey. The anterior sector is partly made up of two areas F4 and F5; 
mirror neurons are located in the F5 area of the Macaque’s brain (Gallese, 1998). 
Presented in the diagram, figure 10, is the lateral view of the Macaque brain. This side 
view of the brain highlights the anatomical location of areas F4 and F5 (Gallese et al, 
1998). 
Figure 10. 
 
       (Rizzolatti et al, 2004) 
In figure 10, the areas labelled with beginning with ‘F’ are the frontal motor areas and 
the areas labelled beginning with ‘P’ or ‘O’, are the posterior parietal areas (Rizzolatti 
and Craighero, 2004). This region makes up the cortical mirror neuron area in the 
Macaque (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
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 There are several hypotheses surrounding the function meaning of area F4, a 
proposed theory by Luciano Fadiga suggests, “The visual discharge of F4 neurons 
reflects a ‘potential action’ directed towards a particular spatial location” (Fadiga et 
al, 2000:171). This means any visual stimulus presented to the Macaque is regarded 
as a ‘potential action’, and the F4 neuron geographically maps the position of the 
stimulus for any potential movement relating to the head or arms (Fadiga et al, 
2000:171). The neurons in area F5 became of significance because the neurons 
became active not only when the Macaque watched another monkey perform an act, 
such as grasping food but also when the Macaque itself grasped the food. 
Experiments identified that the same neural activity occurred when the Macaque 
carried out the action and also when the Macaque observed the action being carried 
out. Vittorio Gallese, a leading neuroscientist whose research predominantly 
investigates mirror neurons and simulation theory, asserts that the mirror neuron 
system has the ability to “form a cortical system matching observation and execution 
of goal-related motor actions” (Gallese and Goldman, 1998:493). Gallese identifies 
that the mirror neuron network facilitates an observation and execution system, 
whereby the Macaques neural network becomes active and begins to fire when they 
are observing a goal related action, such as tearing or grasping. The diagram labelled 
Figure 10 demonstrates that the mirror neurons located in area F5 work as part of a 
wider neural visuomotor network in the Macaque; it goes without saying that the 
neurons are not working alone, the mirror neurons are like a cog in a machine that is 
the brain. However, neuroscientists have become excited about this particular set of 
neurons, because it could lead new ways of thinking about social cognition in 
primates and in humans. It is important to consider this new information for theatre, 
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because it will provide playwrights, directors and actors with a greater understanding 
of how spectatorship actually works at a neurological level.  
 
Mirror neuron trials in the Macaque 
 
On the subsequent pages, there are three figures labelled ‘11’, ‘12’, and ‘13’, these 
diagrams depict the mirror neuron experiments carried out with the Macaque. Each of 
the diagrams follow the same pattern. The diagrams firstly present an image, which 
demonstrates the visual action carried out in the experiment, in order to evoke the 
mirror neuron potentials in the Macaque (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et 
al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012 and Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Food is used 
throughout all of the trials as the prop to provoke the response potentials of mirror 
neurons. Below the image, the middle section, are raster plots that illustrate the neural 
response (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012 
and Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Each row signifies one trial and each raster 
marked is evidence for the mirror neurons firing in response to the action, both 
observed and executed (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and 
Purves et al, 2012 and Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The third section consists of a 
peristimulus histogram, which visualises the amount of neurons being discharged, the 
spikes are indicative of the amount of neurons firing. This means the higher the spike, 
the greater the amount of mirror neurons being discharged in relation to the neural 
response presented in the middle section. You will note on diagrams labelled ‘A’ and 
‘B’ on the histogram, there is a vertical line; this line signifies the precise moment the 
experimenter made physical contact with the food (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and 
Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012 and Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
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Figure 11. 
 
(Purves et al, 2012)  
 
Figure 11 demonstrates the experimenter grasping a food item; the experimenter uses 
one hand to hold the tray on which the food sits, and another hand to actually grasp 
the food. The experimenter then moves the food towards the Macaque; the Macaque 
then grasps the food. The spikes on the histogram show an increase of neuron activity 
when the experimenter begins the action to grasp the food and when the food is 
actually grasped (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 
2012). There is a significant reduction of neurons being discharged when the 
experimenter moves the food towards the Macaque, and an extreme increase when the 
Macaque grasped the food (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and 
Purves et al, 2012). 
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Figure 12. 
 
(Purves et al, 2012)  
 
Figure 12 shows the experimenter initiating contact with the food using pliers as a 
grasping mechanism. The experimenter then moves the food towards the Macaque 
and as in the previous trial the Macaque then grasps the food. The histogram clearly 
indicates that the mirror neurons did not fire when the pliers were used to grasp the 
food or when the experimenter moved the food towards the Macaque (Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012). The only mirror 
neuron activity occurred when the Macaque grasped the food (Gallese and Goldman, 
1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012). 
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Figure 13. 
 
(Purves et al, 2012)  
 
In Figure 13 the trial conditions have been slightly adjusted, the trial took place in 
darkness. The purpose of this condition change is to compare the trial to the two 
previous trials to examine whether the light or darkness affects the mirror neuron 
activity (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012). 
This trial consisted only of the Macaque grasping the food; there was no observation 
element by the Macaque as in the former trials. The histogram records the mirror 
neuron activity as firing when the Macaque begins to reach for the food, the firing 
spikes at a peak when the Macaque has made contact with the food and actually 
grasped the food, and the discharge begins to decrease as the action ends (Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and Purves et al, 2012). 
 
The trials elicited mirror neuron activity by creating various observation and 
execution tasks for the Macaque, the activity of the mirror neurons recorded in the 
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histogram for each separate trial reinforces Gallese’s notion that mirror neurons have 
the potential to form a cortical matching system. This is evident through the 
consistent pattern that emerges in the Macaques neural activity. The mirror neurons 
do not fire for spontaneous reasons or when other apparatus are used, the neurons 
have to be stimulated by hand actions and only fire when observing the action and 
carrying the action out (Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000 and 
Purves et al, 2012). The results of this experiment demonstrate that mirror neurons 
can identify goal-related action; and that the same neurons fire in response to goal 
related action for the self and other, the brain does not distinguish between the two 
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998 and Fadiga et al, 2000). The neural network that 
becomes active and fires in response to the observation, is the same network that fires 
when the observer actually carries the action out himself or herself. Moreover, 
Gallese establishes that the mirror neuron system can detect goal related action and 
without necessarily acting the action out, the brain manifests the action as though it 
were actually carried out by the Macaque (Gallese and Goldman, 1998) 
 
Gallese furthers the necessary requirement of a goal to activate mirror neurons in the 
Macaque, by explaining, “The activity of F5 neurons is correlated with specific hand 
and mouth motor acts and not with the execution of individual movements like 
contractions of individual muscle groups” (Gallese and Goldman, 1998:493). Gallese 
identifies that mirror neurons can distinguish motor acts from simple movement; the 
F5 neurons identify a purpose to the move, a goal. Gallese reiterates that it is 
necessary to understand the difference between movement and a goal related action: 
The distinction is very important since it allows one to interpret the role of the 
motor system not just in terms of dynamic variables of movement (like joint 
torques, etc.), but rather as a possible candidate for the instantiation of mental 
states such as purpose or intention (Gallese and Goldman, 1998:493). 
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The visual action of this goal, as carried out in trials by the neuroscientists, included 
the use of a prop, the prop in this instance was food. The trials recorded the visual and 
motor responses of the Macaque when it observed the experimenter grasp the food, 
when the food was untouched, when the Macaque itself grasped the food, and when 
the Macaque watched another monkey grasp the food (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). 
The trials concluded that the neurons fired only when the food was actively being 
grasped or in the process of, the mirror neurons did not fire and remained silent when 
there was no action taking place (Gallese and Goldman, 1998), therefore the use of a 
prop is necessary in the activation of the neurons for the Macaque.  
 
Through the Macaque trials, mirror neurons emerged as a distinguished system that 
not only responds to precise distal movements but also enables action understanding 
within social interactions (Pellegrino, 1992). The Macaque has the potential, with the 
presence of a prop, to predict the goal related action. In commonplace life for the 
Macaque, the mirror neuron system would exist and function through various daily 
tasks or actions such as; climbing a tree with the intention to reach the top or to reach 
out and grab some berries from a branch to eat. The neurons would also be stimulated 
and become active when watching their conspecifics carry out similar actions. The 
mirror neuron system is a part of social cognition that enables action and intention 
understanding, which underpins the ability of social communication (Gallese, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Lucy Sycamore  September 2015 
MA Thesis 
   59 
Mirror neuron system in humans 
 
From the initial anatomical discoveries and studies of mirror neurons in the Macaque, 
empirical data has suggested a similar observation and execution matching system in 
humans. The mirror neuron system in humans spans across the brain, and interacts 
across different areas. Mirror neurons are “formed by a cortical network composed of 
the rostal part of the inferior parietal lobule and by the caudal sector (pars 
opercularis) of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), plus the adjacent part of the premotor 
cortex” (Gallese, 2004:397). 
Figure 14.     Figure 16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Williams et al, 2013) 
Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Williams et al, 2013)      (Williams et al, 2013) 
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Figure 14 presents a side view of the left side of the human brain (Williams et al, 
2013) of the inferior parietal lobule (Gallese, 2004:397). This area of the brain is 
thought to be involved in spatial perception (Williams et al, 2013). Figure 15 shows a 
side view of the human brain presenting the  “(pars opercularis) of the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG)” (Gallese, 2004:397). Figure 16 shows a side and middle view of the 
premotor cortex in the human (Williams et al, 2013). The premotor cortex is involved 
in helping in the controlling and planning of movements (Williams et al, 2013). 
Through this network of areas in the brain, spans the mirror neuron system. 
 
Gallese et al, note that the human mirror system is a mature system in comparison to 
the Macaque; with research showing that the human mirror system “codes both the 
goal of an observed action and the way in which the observed action is performed”  
(Gallese, 2004). Intransitive and mimed actions are sufficient enough to activate the 
mirror neurons; this means that when the human action/observation matching system 
becomes active and begins to discharge neurons, there doesn’t need to be a prop as 
with the Macaque. The human mirror system can intuit plans or movement intention 
without the physical object being present (Gallese, 2004). Philosopher Pierre Jacob 
and neuroscientist Marc Jeannerod postulate that: 
[T]he perception of biological motion automatically triggers, in the observer, 
the formation of a motor plan to perform the observed movement…Thus, 
motor imagery lies at the interface between planning the movements and the 
observation of others’ movements. Arguably, in humans, the capacity for 
motor imagery may have unique adaptive value, since the observation of 
others’ bodily movements is a crucial source for the learning of skilled 
gestures by imitation (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003, cited in McConachie 
2007:564).  
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Jacob and Jeannerod suggest that the mimetic aspect of how our brain operates, 
underscores social cognition because imitation bridges a self to other gap, and 
facilitates action understanding of others. 
 
The Woman in Black (2015) begins with The Actor trying to convince Arthur Kipps 
that his story needs to be performed and not merely read out. The Actor introduces 
Arthur Kipps to the illusionary world of theatre by demonstrating new technology that 
is at their dispense. Elliot observes the actor click his fingers, and this action signals a 
cue for recorded sound, which echoes through the theatre, and Arthur Kipps is 
amazed at how real the recording sounds.  The Actor then furthers his argument for a 
performance by gesturing with flat open hands towards the basket, Elliot observes 
The Actor grab the basket with both hands and pulls it forwards presenting it to 
Arthur Kipps; The Actor proclaims “A pony and trap”. Elliot’s mirror neurons begin 
to fire in response to the hand gestures directed towards the wicker basket, and again 
as The Actor uses a grabbing hand action to move the prop. Arthur Kipps laughs in 
disbelief; he sees only a wicker basket, The Actor retorts that it is possible to create a 
pony and trap with “Our imagination and our audiences imagination”. Elliot observes 
as The Actor proceeds to seat himself on the basket, he then springs his core upwards 
to create a momentum that helps him to generate a rhythmic bounce; his legs swing 
back and forth and this simulates a movement as if the actor were travelling. The 
Actor, with his right hand clenches it into a fist and raises his hand slowly up high and 
then sharply back down whipping and cutting through the air. The Actor’s left hand 
remains low to his core, with its own kind of rhythm and controlled movement and 
shaped as though it were grasping something. Elliott’s mirror neurons become active 
and detect The Actor’s whipping action with his right hand and The Actor’s left hand 
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grasping invisible reins, the mirror neurons fire in response and simulate the action. 
Elliot sees the physical manifestation of the horse and trap come alive and yet there is 
only a basket and the actor on stage. Jumping forward in the play, the physical 
manifestation of the horse and trap is reprised several times with both The Actor and 
Arthur Kipps. At each reprise the movements are very evocative of the shape, timing, 
rhythm and traveling aspects of the horse and trap, this also adds new layers of 
imagery. Both men create a visual image of the horse and trap travelling over a bump; 
in unison the men lurch their torsos upwards, their hands follow the movement in the 
same positions, they hold the pose for a slight pause and to create a sense of gravity 
pulling them back downwards, they crash down on towards the seat. In a later scene, 
Arthur Kipps adds language to the pony and trap imagery by yelling; “geeeeeerup” 
and simulates a kicking motion that then initiates the horse and trap to once again take 
form. The final physical image created shows Arthur Kipps lurch his body and arms 
forward, his hands are in the grasping position, he clenches them tighter and yanks his 
hands and arms inwards and upwards towards his chest, his body leans back and 
slowly makes small jolts forwards, the men’s legs kick forward and flop back down as 
the horse and trap comes to a stop. Again, Elliot’s mirror neurons become excited by 
the action of The Actor and Arthur Kipps and the neurons begin to fire, Gallese et al 
comment that under these types of conditions, observing a range of hand and arm 
actions elicits excitement in the same muscles in the observer as the executer used in 
the movement (Gallese and Goldman, 1998:495). This means, “Every time we are 
looking at someone performing an action, the same motor circuits that are recruited 
when we ourselves perform that action are concurrently activated” (Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998:495). Elliot’s body has become stimulated with excited mirror neuron 
activity as a direct result of observing The Actor and Arthur Kipps create the pony 
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and trap and the consequential movement that occurs. Elliot can not only see the 
transformation of the wicker basket into a pony and trap, he can feel it within himself, 
and he can feel The Actor’s whipping action in his own body, he can feel the judder 
of the trap in his own torso.  
 
In the play The Actor describes the ability to believe the reality of the pony and trap 
as our ability to imagine. We can imagine things by using the affordances available to 
us and combine the initial image with potential projections that may have previously 
happened or are yet to occur. We can simulate these scenarios in our conscious mind, 
in our action, and language. As the audience begin to understand what is happening 
on stage, they accept the physical manifestation of the pony and trap through their 
mirror neuron systems. Once this has been processed and the information reaches the 
spectators conscious awareness, they can then incorporate this repertoire of action 
into their personal minds, and they can expand and develop the original ideas with 
whatever else they can imagine. As Jacob and Jeannerod ascertain, motor imagery in 
humans enables us to gain knowledge, for Elliot, it means that he has the ability to 
understand more creative imagery that is used later in The Woman in Black (2015). 
 
The Woman in Black (2015) presents a striking piece of imagery by Arthur Kipps and 
The Actor through the creation of Spider the dog. The physical manifestation of 
Spider exists only through Arthur Kipps and The Actors precise and distinct 
movements and interactions with the dog. Arthur Kipps introduces Spider to The 
Actor and the audience by calling for her to come to him, Elliot observes both men 
affix their eyes to the floor by Arthur Kipps feet. The Actor bends down to meet 
Spiders height and opens the palm of his left hand into a relaxed curve; he then 
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strokes Spider from the top of her neck and across her back riding over the contours 
of her spine. Elliot is aware that there is not a real dog on stage and yet through the 
actions of Arthur Kipps and The Actor, Elliot can see the silhouette of the dog on 
stage as clear as he can see both performers, as an audience we form an emotional 
attachment to Spider through movement. Damasio postulates: 
You can find the basic configurations of emotion in simple organisms, even in 
unicellular organisms, and you will find yourself attributing emotions such as 
happiness or fear or anger to very small creatures who, in all likelihood, have 
no feeling of such emotions in the sense that you and I do, creatures which are 
too simple to have a brain, or, having one, too rudimentary to have a mind. 
You make those attributions purely on the basis of the movements of the 
organism, the speed of each act, the number of acts per unit of time, the style 
of movements, and so on. You can do the same thing with a simple chip 
moving about on a computer screen. Some jagged fast movements will appear 
“angry”, harmonious but explosive jumps will look “joyous,” recoiling 
motions will look “fearful”. A video that depicts several geometric shapes 
moving about at different rates and holding varied relationships reliably elicits 
attributions of emotional state from normal adults and even children. The 
reason why you can anthropomorphize the chip or an animal so effectively is 
simple: emotion, as the word indicates, is about movement, about externalized 
behaviour, about certain orchestrations of reactions to a given cause, within a 
given environment (Damasio, 2000:70). 
Elliot’s mirror neurons began firing when The Actor started to stroke Spider, because 
the stroking action simulates the action of how one may interact with an animal, in 
this case it simulates the idea of stoking a dog, which generally people make 
emotional bonds with. Observing Arthur Kipps and The Actor behave with affection 
towards Spider, induces an emotional response from Elliot, and so a representation of 
Spider has formed for Elliot. The Actor continues to interact with Spider by bending 
his stance and begins to direct his lines toward the space that Spider occupies, and it 
becomes clear that he is talking to her. Elliot then observes The Actor whistle and 
snap his right arm upwards and click his fingers in order to gain Spiders attention so 
she can follow him. At this moment, the mirror neurons in Elliot’s brain become 
active and distinguish this clicking action as a way to draw attention to oneself, Elliot 
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immediately focuses onto The Actor because the action has sharpened his own 
awareness. Elliot knows that The Actor has been successful in his ploy for Spider to 
follow him as The Actors eyes swoop from across the stage to his feet, which is 
indicative of Spider travelling. The clicking action not only drew the attention of the 
audience, it also brought the physicality of the dog alive for the audience to see. The 
Actor then strokes Spider again in the same fashion as before, which confirms to 
Elliot that Spider has followed him. Elliot’s mirror neurons begin to fire in response 
to the positioning of The Actors hand and the stroking action that follows; Elliot’s 
brain receives this visual sensory input and uses it to understand what is going on. In a 
later scene set in Mrs Drablow’s house, The Actor decides to play with Spider; he 
calls out her name, whistles and taps his thighs with both hands to beckon her over. 
The Actor uses the same swooping technique to represent Spider travelling. Elliot 
then observes The Actor mimicking the mannerisms of a dog; he droops his head into 
his neck, pokes his tongue out of his mouth, he starts panting and then he begins to 
run around chasing after Spider. Elliot understands that The Actor has created a 
physicalisation of Spider, because he has made a believable realistic animation of her. 
The Actor was able to do this because he uses very simple and particular movements 
as a repertoire for his interactions with Spider, so the audience can easily identify with 
what he is doing. When actions such as these occur, Elliot’s mirror neurons become 
active and his brain begins to function as though it were he stroking and interacting 
with the dog. McConachie writes: 
When they pay attention to intentional human action (in a performance or 
anywhere else), spectators unconsciously mirror the actions of social others 
and use this cognitive information directly to understand their intentions and 
emotions. Although audiences must also interpret spoken language and engage 
in other mental operations when they watch actors performing, interactional 
simulation seems to be primary (McConachie, 2007:565). 
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Elliot understands the physicalisation of the dog on stage, but if he were asked how he 
knew this, he would say that he understood because he heard Arthur Kipps introduce 
the dog and also because he saw the performers act it out. If this question were put to 
the entire audience in the auditorium, their responses would most likely be very 
similar. This response is undoubtedly accurate; Elliot used his signal receptors; eyes 
and ears, to gain knowledge from the external world. However, knowing this only 
demonstrates the beginning and end of the process, there is no explanation of the 
unconscious process that feeds our consciousness and makes us aware of what 
something is; how we know what we know and how we incorporate it into our 
knowledge.   
 
 Explaining what we know or what we think we know, is part of our conscious 
awareness, we can’t explain something that is below this conscious level because we 
do not have access to the internal milieu of our brain or body. Having all this 
information would overwhelm our normal functioning, our brain tells us what we 
need to know, when we need to know. Evolution has primed human beings in this 
way to assist with our automaticity; the mirror neuron system is exemplary of this. 
McConachie comments that: 
It is the spectators who mirror the motor actions of those they watch on stage; 
cognitive imitation is a crucial part of spectatorship. Presumably, playwrights, 
actors, and others also engage their visuomotor representations when they 
write a script and put together a production, but this is a separate process, 
removed from the moment-to-moment interaction that occurs between actors 
and audiences in performance. Mirror neurons do not invalidate Aristotelian 
mimesis, but if we are interested in audience response from a scientific point 
of view, the mode of imitation triggered by these neurons (and their 
consequences) should be part of our explanation (McConachie, 2007:565) 
 
Of course mirror neurons are not exclusive to spectatorship, Elliot’s mirror neuron 
system, operates in exactly the same way for everyday life occurrences as it does for 
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the theatre. Cook notes that, “Mirror neurons themselves do not discriminate between 
an act performed and a witness act” (Cook, 2009:590). The theatre is a contrived 
environment where the audience are positioned to have encounters with the actors and 
are made to engage with their entire range of cognitive abilities. As the 
aforementioned scientists ascertain, this neurological system makes it possible for 
spectatorship to occur because it is the basic fundamental component of how we 
understand others. The human mirror neuron system demonstrates the ability to not 
only understand action in social situations, but that the neurons can also predict future 
action and have the potential to attribute emotional states (Pellegrino, 1992).   
 
Cook states that, “Action understanding, intention, emotional attunement, and 
communication are clearly pivotal in theatre, since without them there is no fear, pity, 
conflict, dramatic irony, subtext or even story” (Cook, 2007:50). This enables the 
audience to get the conceit of the performance being a play within a play. This 
conceits sets up the convention that the performance can break the fourth wall of the 
play. Elliot and the audience understand and accept that Arthur Kipps can break the 
fourth wall and speak directly to the audience, because this convention was set out at 
the beginning of the play. So whenever the fourth wall is broken, the audience 
continue to understand that the performance is still taking place.  
 
When the performers switch between levels of the play and speak to the audience, the 
audience understand that this communication is still part of the actual performance 
and no response is required by them. Elliot observes as Arthur Kipps turns away from 
The Actor, who is standing centre stage, and walks towards the front left of the stage; 
Arthur Kipps positions his torso facing the audience and begins to speak, “Imagine 
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this stage an island, this aisle a causeway”. Although Arthur Kipps and The Actor are 
on stage together and have engaged in conversation throughout the play, Elliot 
understands that this remark is not part of their dialogue with each other. Elliot has 
observed how Arthur Kipps body language has transformed; his 
attention/gaze/gestures/lines are all directed towards the audience rather than The 
Actor. Arthur Kipps is speaking to the audience with the intention of guiding their 
imaginations to allow the next scene to manifest. When Arthur Kipps speaks his lines 
he uses hand gestures to emphasis the narrative; he demonstrates the aisle as the 
causeway by bringing both this hands out in front of him palms facing down, spreads 
his fingers wide and then slowly pushes his right hand forward and outwards, 
simultaneously bringing his left hand backwards. Elliot’s mirror neurons become 
stimulated by these hand actions. In response, Elliot’s brain is constructing the new 
theatre setting and accepts that the stage in front of him has become Mrs Drablow’s 
isolated house. 
 
Arthur Kipps discourse with the audience leaves The Actor in a different zone of the 
play within a play and it allows Arthur Kipps to then narrate the scene and accelerate 
the play without the need for commonsensical details. And so Elliot watches as 
Arthur Kipps narrates the action of The Actor and The Actor continues to act in the 
play within the play, they both perform simultaneously as if it were spontaneous 
rather than in response to each other. It is similar to a sign language interpreter on 
television, they are presented together in the same format and are relevant to each 
other, but audiences understand that the interpreter is separate from the television 
programme. In this particular scene it enables Elliot to listen to Arthur Kipps narrate 
and to observe the actions of The Actor, Elliot focuses his eyes and attention on The 
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Actor because all any additional information he needs to understand what is 
happening is being articulated to him. The scene progresses in a very theatrical 
manner with the use of action, narrative, smoke and lighting, creating one of the plays 
heightened moments that supports the plays renowned thrilling catharsis. Elliot 
observes The Actor is currently being subjected to the supernatural happenings that 
occur in Arthur Kipps Story. Elliot watches as The Actor becomes frantic, he 
proceeds to run around the stage searching for the mysterious figure, opening doors 
and searching in all the rooms, he begins to yell and shout. As the scene begins to 
reach a climax, Elliot notices the lights begin to focus onto the protruding wooden 
frame on stage and light up the door, he looks back to The Actor, who has become 
entranced by the door. Elliot observes as The Actor bends his left knee and brings it 
upwards engaging the hip, his torso leans forward, both hands clenched into a fist as 
his arms raise and lock at his elbows his arms swing back and forth as each leg 
powers up and down, he races to the door. The Actors right hand releases his fist and 
opens to grasp the oval brass doorknob, his left hand opens flat and wide as he slams 
it against the doors wooden panel. Elliot observes The Actors muscular body tense 
and release repeatedly as he exerts more and more power to try and open the door. 
The Actor releases his right hand from the doorknob and slams both hands flat against 
the door, he then slides both hands down the door as he slithers towards the floor, his 
hands then regain a fist clenching action as his whole body slumps to the floor. The 
lights black out for intermission. When Elliot observes The Actor run towards the 
door and try and open it, his mirror neurons are firing because they have detected an 
external stimulus with a goal. The mirror neurons are firing because they are 
predicting that The Actor is going to open the door, so in a matter of milliseconds 
Elliot’s brain has already registered The Actors intentions. However, the door does 
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not open so the prediction of action is not quite right because the goal hasn’t been 
achieved. The mirror neurons projected goal has failed to manifest, Elliot expected 
the door to open when The Actor twisted the doorknob because this is a probable and 
most likely action as a result of the previous action. The fact that it did not open 
creates a dilemma for Elliot’s mirror neurons, as they have to figure out the next 
action. The Actor continues in his efforts to open the door and makes great use of his 
hands, which triggers the mirror neurons again. In this short sequence, Elliot’s mirror 
neurons are manipulated by the performance to receive continuous signals of input, 
because what you expect and think will happen does not. Elliot’s mirror neurons 
continue to spike each time The Actor slams his hands on the wood, and tries to force 
the door open. The director and The Actor have successfully created a theatrical 
sequence that directly stimulates the mirror neurons of the spectators, although this 
neural activation was probably unintentional. This sequence throws the audience, and 
the director knows that because the goal was never completed, it keeps the audience 
on their toes, they have to make more predictions about what they think will happen. 
The audience will begin to contemplate what is going to happen next, will The Actor 
manage to open the door? What is on the other side of the door? What happens now 
as a result of the door not opening? 
 
Whilst all this is happening, the mirror neurons detect the way in which the action 
was carried out, so Elliot attributes corresponding emotions such as fear and anger. 
The predictions of future action and possible emotional states are sparked by the 
action of The Actor and are then supported by Elliot’s ability to read the mind of 
others. Gallese et al define this mind-reading ability as “the activity of representing 
specific mental states of others, for example, their perceptions, goals, beliefs, 
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expectations, and the like” (Gallese and Goldman, 1998:495). McConachie furthers 
this by also including emotion in our attempts to understand the minds of others 
(McConachie in Shaughnessy, 2013). Elliot can read the mind of The Actor because 
he can make inferences about his emotional state. Damasio clarifies: 
We can feel our emotions consistently and we know we feel them. The fabric 
of our minds and of our behaviour is woven around continuous cycles of 
emotion followed by feelings that become known and beget new emotions, a 
running polyphony that underscores and punctuates specific thoughts in our 
minds and actions in our behaviour (Damasio: 2000:43). 
 
The physical display of erratic behaviour by The Actor, lead Elliot to believe that he 
is in a fearful emotional state, the fast bursts of movement in an abnormal manner 
makes Elliot feel The Actor’s distress. A simulation theory of empathy has been 
suggested as a result of the direct access to the minds of others that mirror neurons 
enable. McConachie writes: 
Through mirror network processing of the muscles in another’s face and body, 
humans are able [to] pick up some information about the other’s emotions and 
intentions, information that unconsciously informs empathetic response. By 
approximating other’s intentions through our mirror networks, we can fine-
tune our own responses and intentions towards them (McConachie, 2011: 37). 
Elliot can empathise with The Actor because his own mirror neuron system responds 
to the actions of The Actor by firing in the same way. Elliot’s brain processes the 
information as though it were him carrying out these actions and so this makes it 
possible for him to not only access the mind of The Actor, but Elliot can enter into his 
emotional state. Damasio comments that, “We do not need to be conscious of the 
inducer of an emotion and often are not, and we cannot control emotions wilfully. 
You may find yourself in a sad or happy state, and you may be at a loss as to why you 
are in that particular state now” (Damasio, 2000:47).  Elliot can see the emotion in 
The Actor, and he can feel it himself. Elliot becomes hyper aware, his wide eyes dart 
around the stage looking for possible clues, his breathing becomes rapid, his heart rate 
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increases, his internal milieu has transformed into a state of fear because he has been 
induced by the emotional behaviour of The Actor. Elliot feels as though it were him 
trying to penetrate the door because his mirror neurons initiated a neural process that 
informed the rest of his body that this is what he is doing, this is the situation, respond 
in this way. Of course Elliot does not actually get up and try to open the door, nor 
does Elliot run away in fear as a response, because when these feelings reach his 
conscious awareness, he has control over his external actions. Fuster comments: 
The choosing and evaluating by the cortex goes on all the time even in the 
absence of any need for decision. Many of the choices take place subliminally 
– that is, unconsciously – at low levels of cortical activity. […] Many of our 
decisions come out of our gut feeling, based on a broader and sometimes more 
reliable database than the one we have in conscious awareness. […] Choices 
go on in our brain all the time whether we are aware of them or not. (Fuster, 
2013: pp97-98).  
 
Elliot’s brain uses the activity of his mirror neurons to gain information from external 
sensory information to manifest a coherent “execution/observation matching system” 
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998:493). It is a system that creates a biologically lead 
response in Elliot; his body simulates that of The Actor. The response that is created 
in Elliot is then filtered to gain knowledge and information about the external 
stimulus. From these perceptions it has been suggested that Elliot can read the mind 
of The Actor because he can infer what The Actors goal is, what his intentions are and 
the emotional state of his mind (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). This entire process 
happens below Elliot’s conscious awareness; he has no idea of the activity occurring 
inside his brain whilst watching The Woman in Black (2015), he is not aware at all 
that his mirror neuron system becomes stimulated and excited at the action of The 
Actor and Arthur Kipps. Elliot’s engagement with the theatre is made possible 
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because of the nature of the mirror neuron system. Prior to the discovery of mirror 
neurons Bruce Wilshire presupposed: 
bodies biologically human learn to become human persons by learning to do 
what persons around them are already doing. The learning body mimetically 
incorporates the model; it comes to represent the model and be authorized by 
it… The actor models modelling, enacts enactment, and reveals it. I think it 
plausible to hypothesize that since behaviour and identity were laid down 
bodily, mimetically, and together – in the theatre, for example (Wilshire cited 
in Cook, 2007:588). 
 
Cook supports Wilshire’s assertions, “Indeed, incorporating the model does happen: 
our brains mirror neurons system […] links the actions and intentions of others with 
our own perceptions and actions” (Cook, 2007:588). Elliot’s mirror neuron system 
informs him that The Actor whipping his hand and arm through the air is not doing so 
in a random and unintentional manner, but is doing so because he is using this action 
to represent him using a whip against a horse to make the horse go faster. Elliot’s 
mirror neuron system facilitate the manifestation of Spider the dog, because the 
system detects the interactions of Arthur Kipps and The Actors and compares it to 
how one would interact with an animal. The mirror neuron system also codes the way 
in which the men interact with Spider, notably the affection directed towards the 
animal; they embody stereotypical actions of a dog and mimic the behaviour. Elliot 
understands that this mimicry is carried out in playful manner because his mirror 
neuron system detects how the action was carried out. Elliot’s mirror neuron system 
can catch the emotions of others, Elliot feels the fear of The Actor as he tries 
desperately to open the mysterious door, and makes future predictions from direct 
observations.  
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The discovery of the F5 neuron in the Macaque enabled scientists identify a part of 
the brain that becomes excited in response to the observation of others using a prop to 
carry out an action, and when the Macaque carried the action out themselves. This 
observation and execution matching system in the Macaque enabled neuroscientists to 
discover a similar mechanism in the human neural system; mirror neurons, Gallese et 
al postulate: 
The human brain is endowed with structures that are active both during the 
first- and third-person experience of actions and emotions. When we witness 
someone else’s action, we activate a network of parietal and premotor areas 
that is also active when we perform similar actions. When we witness the 
disgusted facial expressions of someone else, we activate that part of our 
insula that is also active when we experience disgust. Thus, the understanding 
of basic aspects of social cognition depends on activation of neural structures 
normally involved in our own personally experienced actions or emotions. By 
means of this activation, a bridge is created between others and ourselves 
(Gallese et al, 2004:401). 
 
The Actor and Arthur Kipps directly simulate Elliot’s biological experience; their 
performance stimulates Elliot’s mirror neurons, guiding his neural response, shaping 
his experience and perception of the performance. Elliot’s brain is behaving in certain 
ways, making him feel and experience actions and emotional states because he has 
direct access to the minds of the performers. The mirror neurons in Elliot’s brain 
create an internal representation for him, of what it feels like to be The Actor or 
Arthur Kipps, in the situations that manifest on stage. Elliot can truly “get” the 
performance because his brain is replicating the experience for him, he doesn’t need 
to think about the mind of the characters because he is actually experiencing what is 
happening in their minds. Elliot can imagine the pony and trap because he can feel the 
movement of the trap in his own body; his muscles elicit excitement as a direct 
stimulation from The Actors. As The Actor lifts his arm up and strikes it through the 
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air creating a whipping action, this evokes in Elliot what it feels like to carry out this 
whipping action. Elliot not only observes the action but his brain actively registers the 
action as though he were physically carrying it out. Mirror neurons do not only 
facilitate understanding of action and emotion, they have the potential to create a full 
experiential theatre inside of the spectator, as if they were the ones performing 
(Gallese et al, 2004).  
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Thesis conclusion 
 
This thesis arrives at no definite answer; I cannot provide a complete theory on 
spectatorship because there is still so much we do not know about the brain and the 
ubiquitous neural mechanisms that enable us to even think about what a spectator 
does when they watch theatre. However, I hope this research investigation has added 
to an improved understanding of spectatorship. I have used conceptual blending 
theory to illuminate the way a spectator’s mind works. The theatre environment 
positions the spectator to encounter blends that the actors and directors have created, 
the spectator uses these blends as a starting point, from which they integrate and apply 
their own blends to and find commonalities between them. It is through this integrated 
networking system that spectators perceive meaning and create an understanding. 
Conceptual blending allows Elliot to primarily blend the actor to the character, and 
then further allows Elliot to blend the character that is on stage and project a version 
of the character that exists for him.  Elliot will create a blend that works for him, he 
uses an array of internal knowledge and external information as tools to build and 
project the world around him. In the theatre, Elliot makes blends as a spectator as an 
effective and fluid way to make meaning from what is being presented to him, so he 
can respond to the performance with full integrity (Blair, 2009:94). 
 
I have used evolutionary neuroscience in an attempt to create an understanding of 
how a spectator perceives, how a spectator watches theatre, what actually happens in 
a spectators brain watching a performance.  I have tried to identify the neural 
mechanism in our human brain that assists us when watching theatre. From current 
information we have about mirror neurons, the basic knowledge is that the neurons 
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fire in response to an observed other. Elliot’s brain essentially copies the neural 
activity of The Actor and Arthur Kipps. Through this activation of the mirror neuron 
system, Elliot’s brain and body creates an embodiment and experience of what The 
Actor and Arthur Kipps are doing and feeling. The physical action of The Actor 
stimulates Elliot’s own muscles, so he can feel an evocation of the tension and 
struggle that The Actor feels when he tries to force open the door. Elliot feels the 
emotions in the situations on stage because he is subjectively experiencing the minds 
of the performers because his own mind is running in a parallel state. This entire 
process occurs below Elliot’s level of conscious awareness but feeds into Elliot’s 
conscious experience of the theatre, guiding his responses and imagination. Mirror 
neurons have been put forward as a fundamental mechanism for social cognition 
because the neurons allow us to directly understand others in social situations, 
connecting a gap between the first and third person experiences (Gallese et al, 
2004:396). Using current neuroscientific information and hypothesises, this thesis 
proposes that mirror neurons underscore spectatorship, because they create a basic 
and fundamental connection between the actor and the spectator. Hart states: 
behind every actor’s use of his or her body is a body of knowledge, and that 
out of that knowledge emerges a focused intentionality that participates along 
with the body in creating a performance. It may sound simplistic to say so, but 
surely such intentionality emerges from – or at least mediated by – the actor’s 
brain (Hart in McConachie and Hart, 2006:33). 
 
If the performance is premised on the basis of the actor’s body and brain, surely 
spectatorship is based on the intentionality of the spectator’s body and brain.  
 
The Actor and Arthur Kipps bring the performance to a dramatic end, freezing their 
entire bodies. The lights black out. The auditorium lights come up. The stage is 
empty. Julian Forsyth and Antony Eden walk on and take centre stage and to a round 
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of applause they take a bow. Elliot claps audaciously; relieved the terrifying 
experience is over but feels disenchanted that the time has come where he has to leave 
the world of the performance. Elliot looks around the auditorium to evaluate the fear 
factor of the performance, he observes a few wide-eyed jittery spectators. The 
spectator sitting next to him on the left looks rather uneasy. The army of ushers 
appear, lining up against the walls, guiding the audience along to the exit of the 
theatre. Elliot walks out into the dark summer evening, just as the rest of the theatre 
land audiences break away from their chosen show, he has to negotiate the traffic of 
people pouring out of Charlie And The Chocolate Factory. Allowing a herd of hyper 
children and a seemingly fatigued father to cross in front of him, Elliot contemplates 
that the crowd of people are a mix of chocolate wonderland wanderers and distraught 
individuals. He hopes nothing happens to the children.  
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